Eight Reasons for Ibn Taymiyyah's Rejection of Creation ex Nihilo

By Mohammad Abu AbdurRahman

(The following article is based on a thread originally published on X, formerly Twitter.)

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

All praise is due to God. May He elevate the mention of His final Prophet and Messenger, Muhammad ﷺ.

It was recently suggested by a Muslim preacher that the Shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah – may God have mercy on him – believed that God must have always been creating things from eternity, as evidenced by His necessary and perpetual wisdom, but did not believe that God creates things strictly by way of material causes. I hold that this suggested reading of Ibn Taymiyyah is mistaken.

I instead believe that Ibn Taymiyyah maintained a more rational position, which not only states that God creates perpetually on account of wise purposes, but also that creation ex nihilo – creating something without a prior material cause – is impossible absolutely. I base my inference on a unique section written by Ibn Taymiyyah in his late work Kitab al-Nubuwwat, translated in "Ibn Taymiyyah on Creation ex Materia".

In this unique theological view, God constantly prepares material causes in order to originate their subsequent effects. His voluntary creative agency is perpetual by necessity, such that it is of the very nature of God to voluntarily originate one created effect after having voluntarily originated a preceding created effect that served as its material condition. Still, although God creates strictly *ex materia* – that is, by way of material causes – and never creates ex nihilo, none of the particular material entities accompanies Him from eternity.

Matter in this uniquely Taymiyyan view is not an eternal substance that merely rearranges into new forms, but is rather a collection of distinct substances that are subject to creation and annihilation. God is the only eternal being in existence, and He is ever-creating things by His will, in an infinite regress of divine creative acts, endowing materials with existence and removing others from existence in succession. He alone possesses the unique ability of speaking matter into existence, but He may only do so after speaking prior, suitable material conditions and

secondary causes into existence, ones which carry the potential for the next substantial origination, and so on ad infinitum.

Here, I mention eight reasons that illustrate that the suggested reading of the aforementioned preacher is mistaken, and why the most plausible reading of Kitab al-Nubuwwat is that Ibn Taymiyyah did in fact argue for the impossibility of creation ex nihilo, and that God may only create things through previously created material causes.

First reason

The first reason is the historical context of Ibn Taymiyyah's statement. On the one hand, the Kalam theologians were of the view that the possibility of substantial origination is a conceptual meaning, not an attribute that exists "out there" in the real world. This allowed the Kalam theologians to believe that the possibility of substantial origination is not grounded in any material substrate, in turn allowing them to uphold the allegedly scriptural doctrine that creation ex nihilo is possible and is included within the scope of God's omnipotence. On the other hand, the Aristotelean philosophers were of the view that the possibility is ontologically positive, existing "out there" in the real world, and that it must therefore subsist in a material substrate that carries it. This in turn meant that creation ex nihilo must be impossible absolutely.

Ibn Taymiyyah was aware of this old dispute. After he originally argued in Mas'alat Huduth al-'Alam that the possibility is conceptual, and that therefore there is room to believe in creation ex nihilo, he sided with the Philosophers in Kitab al-Nubuwwat, stating that the possibility of substantial origination is an ontologically positive attribute, such that God creates strictly by way of causes.

وأيْضًا فالدَليلُ الّذي احْتَجَّ بِهِ كَثيرٌ مِنَ الناسِ عَلىٰ أنّ كُلّ حادِثٍ لا يَحْدُثُ إلا مِنْ شَيْءٍ، أو في شَيْءٍ؛ فَإنْ كانَ عَرَضًا لَمْ[196] يَحْدُثْ إلا في[197] مَحَلٍّ، وإنْ كانَ عَيْنًا قائِمَةً بِنَفْسِها لَمْ يَحْدُثْ إلا مِنْ مادَّةٍ، فَإنَّ الحادِثَ إنَّما يَحْدُثُ إذا كانَ حُدوثُه مُمْكِنًا، وكانَ يَقْبَلُ الوُجودَ والعَدَمَ، فَهُوَ مَسْبوقٌ بِإمْكانِ الحُدوثِ وجَوازِهِ، فَلا بُدَّ لَهُ مِنْ مَحَلٍّ يَقومُ بِهِ هَذا الإمْكانُ والجَوازُ.

Also, [there exists] the [Aristotelean] argument which many people use [to demonstrate] that every originating thing originates *out of* something or *in* something: If it is an accident, it originates only in a substrate, and if it is a self-subsisting concrete thing, it originates only out of matter. For an originating thing will originate only if its origination was possible and only if it accepted both existence and nonexistence. It is therefore preceded by the possibility and the permissibility of its origination. [But] there must exist a [prior] substrate in which this possibility and permissibility subsist.

If Ibn Taymiyyah's newly adopted position does not require him to accept that creation ex nihilo is impossible, he would be owing us an explanation as to why the impossibility does not follow given the

general context of the dispute. Ibn Taymiyyah provides no such explanation.

Furthermore, in at least three places in Kitab al-Nubuwwat, Ibn Taymiyyah hints at the impossibility of creation ex nihilo before he explicitly asserts that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive. This brings us to reasons two to four.

Second reason

The claim that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive, and is thus grounded in a material substrate, is equivalent to claiming that the causal principle is universally true at the level of secondary, material causation, and not just at the Primary, divine level of causation. This commitment to the universality of the causal principle allows us to appreciate the Qur'anic argument for God's existence with exceptional philosophical clarity.

Put differently, if we maintain the universality of the causal principle in such a way that all natural effects require preceding material and natural causes, without which their generation would be impossible, then the substantial origination of these natural effects, out of their prior material and secondary causes, will require an external Originator a fortiori – an eternal God without whom the substantial origination would be impossible. The attempt to infer God's existence, through

alleged acts of ex nihilo creation, is in fact an attempt to demonstrate His existence by undermining the universality of the very causal principle, which we dearly need in order to arrive at His existence in the first place.

Ibn Taymiyyah hints at this subtle nuance in a statement in Kitab al-Nubuwwat, setting the stage for his later claim that the possibility is ontologically positive. His exact words are: "Things originating ex nihilo are somewhat similar to things originating without an Originator".



وحُدوثُ الشَّيْءِ لا مِنْ مادَّةٍ قَدْ يُشْبِهُ حُدوثَهُ مِنْ غَيْرِ رَبٍّ خالِقٍ، وقَدْ يُظَنُّ أَنَّهُ حَدَثَ مِنْ ذاتِ الرَّبِّ؛ كَما قِيلَ مِثْلُ ذَلِكَ في المَسيحِ، والمَلائِكَةِ أَنَّها بَناتُ اللهِ، لَمّا لَمْ يَكُنْ لَها أَبٌ[١٩٢]، مَعَ أَنَّها مَخْلوقَةٌ مِنْ مادَّةٍ؛ كَما ثَبَتَ في الصَحيحِ: «صَحيحِ مُسْلِمٍ» عَنْ عائِشَةَ: أَنَّ النَبِيَّ ﷺ قالَ: «خُلِقَتِ المَلائِكَةُ مِنْ نورٍ، وخُلِقَ الجانُّ مِنْ مارِجٍ مِنْ نارٍ، وخُلِقَ آدَمُ مِمّا وُصِفَ لَكُمْ».

Also, things originating ex nihilo are somewhat similar to things originating without an Originator[193], and they may also be mistaken

Third reason

Thirdly, Ibn Taymiyyah points out that the negation of the material causes preceding a particular substance can confuse some people into believing that it was begotten by God, or even created by God out of His own essence. Indeed, because Christ was created without a father,

some Christians mistakenly assumed that he was begotten by God – although Jesus was in fact created out of material causes, namely: his mother's substance and the breath of the Holy Spirit Gabriel.



فَما خُلِقَ مِنْ غَيْرِ مادَّةٍ تكونُ[١٩٠] كالأبِ لَهُ، قَدْ يُظَنُّ فيهِ أنَّهُ ابْنُ اللهِ، وأنَّ اللهَ خَلَقَهُ مِنْ ذاتِهِ. فَلِهَذا كانَتِ الأنْبِياءُ مَخْلوقَةً مِنْ مادَّةٍ، لَها أُصولٌ، ومِنْها فُروعٌ، لَها والِدٌ ومَوْلودٌ. والأَحَدُ الصَمَدُ: لَمْ يَلِدْ، ولَمْ يُولَدْ، ولَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ كُفُواً أَحَدٌ.

[Indeed,] a thing which is created out of no [prior] matter that acts like its father could be mistaken [by some people] as a [begotten] son of God[191] and that God created it out of His own essence. And

Ibn Taymiyyah's argument makes sense when one accepts the position that creation ex nihilo is impossible. According to this theological view, the possibility of the substantial origination of Jesus (peace be upon him) must be carried by a prior substrate, for the possibility is taken to be ontologically positive. That preceding substrate is either (i) the material world, or (ii) God. It must be the material world; because otherwise, only God would be left to serve as the material condition, which would contradict His independence and eternality. As it is mentioned in the Qur'anic verse: {He begets not nor was He begotten}.

Fourth reason

Fourthly, Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges an argument that states that angels would be eternal if they were not created out of matter. He mentions this right before he asserts that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive.



ولمّا ظَنَّ طائِفَةٌ أنَّها لَمْ تُخْلَقْ مِنْ مادَّةٍ، ظَنّوا أنَّها قَديمَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ.

And when a group of people assumed that the angels were not created out of matter, they [incorrectly] thought that they are eternal and without beginning[195].

The reasoning here is that the prior material conditions from which God creates angels must be said to carry the possibility of their substantial origination. Without the existence of these materials that carry the possibility, the angels would not be possible existents. Instead, they would either be (i) impossible, in which case they would not exist, or (ii) necessary, in which case they would be eternal and uncreated.

This reason beautifully illustrates that Ibn Taymiyyah held that creation ex nihilo is impossible absolutely, and that the possibility of substantial origination must be carried by a material substrate. Otherwise, Ibn Taymiyyah would be acknowledging the coherence of the speculation that angels are both (i) possible creations, and (ii) not preceded by any material causes.

Fifth reason

The fifth reason appeals to the evolution of Ibn Taymiyyah's views on the question of material conditions. This reason requires a somewhat lengthy explanation, to which we turn below.

Ibn Taymiyyah originally maintained the view that creation ex nihilo is possible and included within the scope of God's omnipotence. Still, even in this early stage, Ibn Taymiyyah never argued that the material conditions are superfluous with regard to the effects they produce. This is contrary to what I mistakenly asserted in the first edition of "Ibn Taymiyyah on Creation ex Materia", as noted in the erratum.

In consistency with this important nuance, Ibn Taymiyyah states in his work, Minhaj al-Sunnah, that something that is created out of an element cannot possibly be created without that element. As an example, human beings as we know them require the elements of the earth. The possibility of the substantial origination of human beings – as we know them – is not permanently true, but rather emerges due to God preparing the prior, suitable material causes in the form of earthly elements. Without the preparation of these prior causes, the origination of the human being – as we know it – remains impossible.

It is important to note that the necessity of the material conditions, in regard to the origination of human beings, does not mean that God is limited in His act of creating the human beings – as we know them – to only one particular method of creation. Indeed, God can create us

through ordinary means of human conception as well as out of the earth directly. God can also create human beings through miraculous means of conception, such as through the breath of an angel. Recall that Jesus was conceived miraculously by Mary without a father, through the breath of the Holy Spirit Gabriel who breathed into her.

Nevertheless, the different kinds of secondary and material causes employed by God in creating human beings must have a say in regard to the effect produced in its entirety. Across the different scenarios and methods of creation, the produced effect – the human being – must differ in at least some of its attributes or by-products. For example, it is possible for the very same substance of our bodies, which is created through ordinary means of human conception, to be created out of the earth directly on the Day of Resurrection, with our bodies differing in at least some of their attributes and accompanying by-products.



وصِفاتٌ لَيْسَتْ لِلأُولَىٰ. فَمَعْرِفَةُ الإنْسانِ بالخَلْقِ الأَوَّلِ، وما يَخْلُقُهُ مِنْ بَنِي آدَمَ وغَيْرِهِمْ مِنَ الحَيَوانِ، وما يَخْلُقُهُ مِنَ الشَّجَرِ والنَّباتِ والثِّمارِ، وما يَخْلُقُهُ مِنَ السَّحابِ والمَطَرِ وغَيْرِ ذَلِكَ= هُوَ أَصْلٌ لِمَعْرِفَتِهِ بالخَلْقِ والبَعْثِ، بالمَبْدَأِ والمَعادِ.

And when man has died and become [part of the] earth, he will have totally perished and ceased to exist, just like all others upon the earth will. God says: **{Everyone upon it will perish}**. God will then resurrect him out of the earth just as He created him out of it before; He will create him anew. But [this] second Creation will have specifications and features which the first [one] did not. [Indeed,] the hu-

This Taymiyyan understanding is a scientific one, fully consistent with natural law. Consider that the very same water molecules can be created through burning hydrogen and through burning wood, with the produced effect differing in at least some of its attributes and by-products. Indeed, carbon dioxide is created alongside water when burning wood, but not when burning hydrogen.

This fact that material conditions are never superfluous, with regard to their produced effect, is further indicated in one of Ibn Taymiyyah's discussions in his work Mas'alat Huduth al-'Alam, where he objects to an inductive argument by which Aristotelean philosophers attempt to demonstrate that creation ex nihilo is impossible universally. There, Ibn Taymiyyah acknowledges that the Philosophers are justified in believing that the kinds of substances that are observed to originate out of matter do in fact require their material conditions, but objects to the claim that all of the kinds of substances must be created ex materia. This is because it was not known empirically in Ibn Taymiyyah's time that all of the kinds of substances originate out of prior material conditions.

يُبَيِّنُ ذَلِكَ: أَنَّ كَوْنَ الفاعِلِ مُتَقَدِّمًا عَلىٰ المَفْعولِ أَمْرٌ مُسْتَقِرٌّ في العَقْلِ والحِسِّ، مَعَ أَنَّهُ لا يَحْتاجُ إِلىٰ شَهادَةِ الحِسِّ، ولَوْ قِيلَ: مُتَقَدِّمٌ بالذَاتِ. بِخِلافِ كَوْنِ المَفْعولِ أَوِ المُحْدَثِ يفْتَقِرُ إِلىٰ مادَّةٍ، فَهَذا لَيْسَ مَعْلومًا بالعَقْلِ، وإِنَّما شُبْهَةُ قائِلِهِ كَوْنُهُ لَمْ يُحِسَّ مُحْدَثًا إلا كَذَلِكَ. وأَيْنَ قَضِيَّةٌ

This nuance is further clarified by a statement in Bayan Talbis al-Jahmiyyah, where Ibn Taymiyyah mentions that the simple substances, unlike the complex ones, are a special kind of substance that comes into existence ex nihilo. There, he implicitly acknowledges that we have never witnessed the initial substantial origination of the simple elements. Ibn Taymiyyah was particularly able to hold this position because he originally did not believe that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive, but that it is conceptual instead. More clearly, his theory of metaphysical modality at the time allowed him to speculate that the simple substances may be a special kind of substance that is originated ex nihilo and without prior material conditions.

However, given that Ibn Taymiyyah later became convinced that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive and that it is grounded in a material substrate, as he explicitly mentions in Kitab al-Nubuwwat, one is forced to conclude that Ibn Taymiyyah's theological position evolved over time into one where God creates all of the kinds of substances, both the simple and the compound, by way of material and secondary causes.

This concludes the explanation of the fifth reason, illustrating Ibn Taymiyyah's rejection of creation ex nihilo. We now turn to the last three reasons to conclude our list of eight reasons.

Sixth reason

The claim that God creates strictly by way of material causes implies a broader commitment to the existence of two very different kinds of possibility that must always come together. The first is the possibility of God to create, which subsists in Himself, and the second is the possibility of substances to come into existence, which subsists in the material substrate. Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly mentions this distinction in Kitab al-Nubuwwat.

والإمْكانُ الخارِجِيُّ المُتَعَلِّقُ بالفاعِلِ، أوِ المَحَلِّ؛ مِثْلُ أنْ تَقولَ: يُمْكِنُ القادِرُ أنْ يَفْعَلَ، والمَحَلُّ مِثْلُ أنْ تَقولَ: هَذِهِ الأرْضُ يُمْكِنُ أنْ تُزْرَعَ، وهَذِهِ المَرْأةُ يُمْكِنُ أنْ تَحْبِلَ = هَذا لا بُدَّ فيهِ[199] مِنْ مَحَلٍّ خارِجِيٍّ،

As for the extra-mental possibility[200] [of things], which is related to an agent or a substrate, such as [the possibility that is related to an agent] when one says: "It is possible for an able agent to act", or [the possibility that is related to] a substrate when one says: "It is possible for this earth to be planted" and "it is possible for this woman to become pregnant with a child" – this [kind of possibility] must have a substrate which exists ontologically.

فَإذا قِيلَ عَنِ الرَبِّ: يُمْكِنُ أنْ يَخْلُقَ؛ فَمَعْناهُ أنَّهُ يَقْدِرُ عَلىٰ ذَلِكَ، ويَتَمَكَّنُ مِنْهُ. وهَذِهِ صِفَةٌ قائِمَةٌ بِهِ.

For example, when it is said that "it is possible for the Lord to create", the meaning is that He has **power** and is **able** to do so. Such a possibility is an [ontologically existing] attribute that subsists in His essence.

Seventh reason

Ibn Taymiyyah justifies the validity of his claim that the possibility of substantial origination is ontologically positive by drawing on scriptural considerations, namely that God has never once mentioned in Scripture that He created anything without a material cause.



فالحُدوثُ مَسْبوقٌ[٢٠٢] بِإمْكانِهِ، ولا بُدَّ لإمْكانِهِ مِنْ مَحَلٍّ، ولِهَذا لَمْ يَذْكُرِ اللهُ قَطُّ أَنَّهُ أَحْدَثَ شَيْئًا إلا مِنْ شَيْءٍ.

Thus, the origination [of things] is preceded by its possibility. And for that possibility, there must exist a substrate. And this is why God only mentions [in the Qur'ān] that He creates things out of others[203], [not ex nihilo.]

If Ibn Taymiyyah did not believe that the ontological positivity of possibility entails that God creates strictly by way of material causes, why would he justify the claim of ontological positivity using this particular scriptural evidence?

Eighth reason

Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly states that the origination of the genus of creations ex nihilo – that is, without a material cause – is analogous to the origination of the genus of events without an originating cause, namely: the impossible notion of God starting to act after He is completely inactive, not doing anything at all from all eternity.


والّذي يَقولُ: إنَّ جِنْسَ الحَوادِثِ حَدَثَتْ لا مِنْ شَيْءٍ، هُوَ كَقَوْلِهِمْ: إنَّها حَدَثَتْ بِلا سَبَبٍ حادِثٍ، مَعَ قَوْلِهِمْ إنَّها كانَتْ مُمْتَنِعَةً، ثُمَّ صارَتْ مُمْكِنَةً مِنْ غَيْرِ تَجَدُّدِ سَبَبٍ، بَلْ حَقيقَةُ قَوْلِهِمْ أنَّ الرَبَّ صارَ قادِرًا بَعْدَ أنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ، مِنْ غَيْرِ تَجَدُّدِ شَيْءٍ يُوجِبُ ذَلِكَ. وهَذِهِ الأُمورُ كُلُّها مِنْ

In other words, Ibn Taymiyyah argues for the following point. Just as God cannot move from a state in which it is impossible for Him to act to a state in which it is possible for Him to act, without the prior occurrence of a divine event that explains the movement towards the possibility, the state of affairs in which substantial origination is impossible, due to there being absolutely no material condition initially, cannot move to a state of affairs in which substantial origination is possible without the prior emergence of a material explanation. This is consistent with Ibn Taymiyyah's more general position, which affirms that the possibility of the substantial origination of each particular creation is not permanently true, but rather becomes true as God is originating the successive material conditions.

These eight reasons compel me to conclude that Ibn Taymiyyah maintained that causal explanations are necessary not just at the level of God's internal succession, such as in regard to His wise purposes and divine acts, but also at the level of secondary causation within the natural world. God creates strictly through causes, never ex nihilo.

God is without partner

The fact that God may not create things ex nihilo – that is, without using prior material causes – does not mean that God is causally dependent on, or assisted by, any material or receptive conditions. Rather, God is the Creator of all things, both the effects and their causes. Everything returns to His unique and independent creative will and power.

The necessity of the infinite regress of secondary causes is a consequence of the necessity of the regress of God's creative acts, not the other way around. God does not depend on the material substrate in any sense that contradicts the argument from contingency, which indeed conclusively establishes that God must be absolutely independent of everything else. More explicitly, the claim that God requires a suitable material cause, in order to create the subsequent effect, is in fact equivalent to claiming that God's later act of creation ex materia is conditioned on an earlier act of creation ex materia. God's creative act is conditioned on His own preceding act, in an infinite regress of divine acts that are internal to Himself. This is compatible with God's absolute self-sufficiency, as the creative act is not conditioned on external things that are not of His own making.

This surely means that God's acts of creation ex materia do not resemble the assisted natural agencies of created beings, such as the agency of the sun, which is frequently mentioned by Ibn Taymiyyah as an example of dependent agency. Indeed, the sun is not an

independent efficient cause that sufficiently produces its light rays; it is not the author of the receptivity of the earth's atmosphere that allows for the light rays to arise. Furthermore, in producing its light rays, the sun acts *in partnership* with the earth's atmosphere, and can also be *restricted* by the clouds from producing them.

Such partnerships are characteristic of all kinds of natural agency, and thus serve as a conclusive evidence for the absolute Oneness of God. Unlike created agents, which must act in partnership, God cannot be assisted or restricted. He alone acts on His own, and He is the independent Creator of absolutely everything in the material world.

Why this discussion matters

In conclusion, I hope the readers do not misinterpret my thread as an unnecessary theoretical exercise where I meticulously insist on interesting but practically useless details. If I were not convinced of the importance of these and other related issues, I would not have worried if I got them wrong, and would have happily moved on. The fact of the matter is that the careful and honest verification of these theological matters is more urgent now than ever before, because we are currently living in a world that is greatly shaped by materialist and naturalistic paradigms, a world in which science has earned universal respect across the globe. The influential intellectuals of this contemporary world speak in the language of science and physics.

Furthermore, prominent figures like Richard Dawkins have successfully brought their naturalistic commitments from the academic world down to the popular level. Due to the rational appeal of these commitments, many laypeople are now very confused and have left religion altogether. They cannot believe in God even if they wanted to. This confusion has also impacted the Muslim world, which, in my estimation, is ill-equipped at the moment to deal with these challenges.

This is why I believe that Ibn Taymiyyah's theology is today priceless. Ibn Taymiyyah has a special way of acknowledging many of the intuitive, rational commitments of materialist philosophers and scientists (such as physicalism, the first law of thermodynamics, empiricism, and other such principles that prove axiomatic to the modern mind) while simultaneously arguing for a highly scriptural understanding of religion with unmatched philosophical rigour, and most importantly, for the existence of God, His oneness, and His perfection, through many of these very same commitments the modern world perceives to be antithetical to religion. I know this first-hand, because I once suffered from the very same commitments the materialists suffer from. I was unable for a very long time to maintain my physicalist and scientific intuitions while upholding my belief in God in a rationally satisfying way. By the grace of God, I found the solution in Taymiyyan theology, and much more than I ever hoped for.

Given the enormous challenges and opportunities presented by the current intellectual state of the modern world, there is very little to be desired in projects like converting Ash'aris to the Athari creed. Instead, I pray that Allah allows the Athari creed, specifically Abrahamic monotheism as understood by Ibn Taymiyyah, to become the only intellectually plausible option available to the modern mind, from the West all the way to China.

One of my great worries is that Western civilization would lose its scientific and intellectual "high-ground" before Taymiyyan theology becomes sufficiently clear to the masses, giving way to competing strands of irrational dogmatism and anti-scientific modes of thinking in its place. In my estimation, if this happens (God forbid!), we may lose our chance of universally establishing Tawhid as the only intellectually plausible option in the modern world, possibly until Jesus (peace be upon him) returns. This is because the universally shared language of naturalism, which makes it very easy for a Taymiyyan preacher to conclusively demonstrate the Athari conception of Abrahamic monotheism to the modern world, could then be gone forever.

To explore what a highly rational, Athari understanding of Islamic Tawhid could look like, read the following article which discusses the argument for Islamic monotheism. Also, read the following Taymiyyan response to Richard Dawkins' arguments in his best-selling book "The God Delusion".

May the Merciful God guide us all, and may He allow us all to see the truth clearly and follow it sincerely wherever it happens to be. Ameen.

May Allah elevate the mention of His Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, his household, and his companions. May He send upon them His peace and His blessings.

And the last of our prayers is:

{All praise is due to God, the Lord of the worlds}.